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Abstract 34 
Wild bird–origin influenza A viruses (IAVs or avian influenza) have led to 35 
sporadic outbreaks among domestic poultry in the United States (US) and Canada, 36 
resulting in economic losses through the implementation of costly containment practices 37 
and destruction of birds. We used evolutionary analyses of virus sequence data to 38 
determine that 78 H5 low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs) isolated from 39 
domestic poultry in the US and Canada during 2001–2017 resulted from 18 independent 40 
virus introductions from wild birds. Within the wild bird reservoir, the hemagglutinin 41 
gene segments of H5 LPAIVs exist primarily as two co-circulating genetic sublineages, 42 
and our findings suggest the H5 gene segments flow within each migratory bird flyway 43 
and among adjacent flyways, with limited exchange between the non-adjacent Atlantic 44 
and Pacific Flyways. Phylogeographic analyses provided evidence that IAVs from 45 
dabbling ducks and swans/geese contributed to emergence of viruses among domestic 46 
poultry. H5 LPAIVs isolated from commercial farm poultry (i.e. turkey) were descended 47 
from a single introduction typically remain a single genotype, whereas those from live 48 
bird markets sometimes led to multiple genotypes, reflecting the potential for 49 
reassortment with other IAVs circulating within live bird markets. H5 LPAIV introduced 50 
from wild birds to domestic poultry represent economic threats to the U.S. poultry 51 
industry, and our data suggest that such introductions have been sporadic, controlled 52 
effectively through production monitoring and a stamping-out policy, and are, therefore, 53 
unlikely to result in sustained detections in commercial poultry operations. 54 
 55 
 56 
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Importance 58 
Integration of viral genome sequencing into influenza surveillance for wild birds 59 
and domestic poultry can elucidate evolutionary pathways of economically costly poultry 60 
pathogens. Evolutionary analyses of H5 LPAIVs detected in domestic poultry in US and 61 
Canada during 2001–2017 suggest that these viruses originated from repeated 62 
introductions of IAVs from wild birds, followed by various degrees of reassortment. 63 
Reassortment was observed where biosecurity was low and there were opportunities for 64 
more than one virus to circulate existed (e.g. congregations of birds from different 65 
premises such as live bird markets). None of the H5 lineages identified were maintained 66 
long term in domestic poultry, suggesting that management strategies have been effective 67 
in minimizing the impacts of virus introductions on US poultry production.  68 
 69 
 70 
  71 
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Introduction 72 
Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are single-stranded, negative sense RNA viruses with 73 
eight genomic segments. Wild waterbirds, especially migratory waterfowl, such as geese 74 
and ducks, along with gulls and shorebirds are purported to be the natural reservoir for 75 
IAVs of the hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes H1–16 and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes N1–76 
9. IAVs are maintained in wild waterbirds, and those of low pathogenicity result in 77 
enteric infections with rare evidence of clinical illness. In contrast, IAVs typically result 78 
in respiratory disease in gallinaceous birds, such as chickens and turkeys; clinical signs 79 
and disease severity vary and are strain-dependent. Subtypes H5 and H7 low pathogenic 80 
avian influenza A viruses (LPAIVs) demonstrate the potential to evolve from low to 81 
highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses (HPAIVs) through increased HA cleavability 82 
by acquiring multiple basic amino acids (1-3) or insertions (4-8) at the cleavage site 83 
during replication (8, 9). H5 and H7 HPAI causes high mortality among domestic poultry 84 
leading to large economic losses.  85 
Reassortment is another mechanism that can contribute to the generation of novel 86 
and economically costly IAVs in domestic birds. For example, H7N9 and H10N8 IAVs 87 
recently identified in China appear to have wild bird–origin HA and NA genes and 88 
internal genes from IAVs circulating among domestic poultry (10, 11). Both of these 89 
reassortant viruses have been associated with human disease that may have resulted from 90 
contact with infected birds at live bird markets (LBMs). A H7N9 IAV that most likely 91 
resulted from reassortment of H7, N9, and H9N2 avian IAVs has caused >1,566 human 92 
infections and at least 613 deaths in China (11, 12); a H10N8 avian-origin IAV also 93 
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 7 
originated from reassortant of H10N8 and H9N2 IAVs in LBMs and caused human 94 
infections (10, 13).  95 
 In the United States (US) and Canada (collectively referred to as North America 96 
for the purposes of this study), poultry production systems include large commercial 97 
poultry farms (CPFs), backyard poultry operations (BYPs), game bird poultry farms 98 
(GBPs), and LBMs. CPFs are defined as large-scale commercial poultry farms 99 
with >1,000 domestic birds per year. BYPs are defined as residential farms raising small 100 
flocks of domestic birds; these, typically produce ≤1,000 birds per year. GBPs are poultry 101 
operations raising small flocks of game birds, such as pheasants and quail, often released 102 
for sport harvest. LBMs are operations that typically supply live birds for on-site 103 
slaughter to consumers. Some, such as botanicas, may sell live birds as well. LBMs may 104 
acquire birds from both non-CPF and CPF sources. In the US, CPFs are located primarily 105 
in the southern and midwestern regions, while many LBMs are located in urban areas of 106 
the western and northeastern regions; and BYPs and GBPs are present in all regions (14-107 
16).  108 
Detections of IAVs in domestic poultry are not uncommon (17); wild bird–origin 109 
IAVs are usually identified as the source of virus across a variety of North American 110 
poultry production systems (3, 9, 17-21). In rare cases, LPAIVs circulating in LBMs have 111 
been associated with outbreaks at commercial farms (22). However, there is limited 112 
information regarding the evolutionary patterns of IAVs detected in North American 113 
poultry. Such information is necessary to improve our collective understanding of the 114 
natural reservoirs (location and wild bird taxa) in which viruses that ultimately lead to 115 
poultry outbreaks are maintained, how evolutionary mechanisms for IAVs might vary 116 
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between poultry production systems, and the frequency with which IAVs are shared 117 
among CPFs, BYBs, GBPs, and LBMs.  118 
In this study, we genetically characterized and compared inferred evolutionary 119 
pathways of 78 H5 LPAIVs from the US and Canada during 2001–2017. This study 120 
seeks to explore the evolutionary pathways of IAVs that move from wild birds into 121 
domestic poultry. Better understanding of viruses at this interface will help improve 122 
influenza surveillance and management strategies, reduce economic and animal losses, 123 
and decrease opportunities for the generation of novel pathogens including those that can 124 
infect humans and cause pandemic influenza threats.    125 
 126 
Results 127 
H5 LPAIVs were sporadically detected in CPFs and LBMs. In this study, an isolate is 128 
defined as an IAV recovered from wild birds or domestic poultry, and an introduction is 129 
defined as a case of IAV infection in domestic poultry; one or more isolates may be 130 
recovered from the same introduction. A total of 78 H5 LPAI isolates from domestic 131 
poultry in North America during 2001–2017 were included in the study. Isolates were 132 
recovered from CPFs (n = 11), BYPs (n = 3), GBPs (n = 2), and LBMs (n = 62) (Table 1). 133 
H5 isolates were identified on CPFs in turkey (n = 11, commercial turkey growers are 134 
indoor operations with curtain-sides); from BYPs in a mallard duck, a domestic duck and 135 
a guinea fowl; from GBPs in a pheasant and a quail; and in LBM samples collected from 136 
domestic ducks (n = 42), chicken (n = 7), guinea fowl (n = 6), turkey (n = 1), quail (n = 137 
2), pheasant (n=1), and unknown species (n = 3) (Table 1). Based upon the inferred 138 
phylogenetic relationships and nucleotide identities for the HA gene segment, these 78 139 
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 9 
H5 poultry isolations result from 18 independent introductions (details in Materials and 140 
Methods) (Figure 1A; Figure S1. Among the 18 introductions, 5 were detected in CPFs, 9 141 
in LBMs, 2 from a BYP, and 2 from a GBP (Figure 1A). Each introduction event was 142 
identified by the operation type, state, year, and HA/NA subtype from the first isolate; for 143 
example ‘CPF-WI-2017(H5N2)’ denotes an H5N2 event in commercial turkeys from 144 
Wisconsin during 2017. Where more than one event occurred in a state within one year, 145 
the events are distinguished by a letter; for example ‘LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)a’ and ‘LBM-146 
NJ-2006(H5N2)b’ represent two independent H5N2 events in New Jersey LBMs during 147 
2006.  148 
 149 
H5 LPAIVs from US and Canadian domestic poultry are of North American lineage 150 
and share genetic ancestry with wild bird–origin IAVs. Geographic lineage was 151 
assigned based upon phylogenetic analyses of the HA gene for the 78 H5 LPAIVs; we 152 
considered this lineage to be comprised primarily of four distinct sublineages (Figure 1B). 153 
A total of 70 of the 78 domestic poultry isolates characterized in this study, as well as the 154 
majority of the wild bird–origin H5 LPAIVs identified in the US and Canada from 2001 155 
to 2017 clustered within sublineages 1 and 2. Viruses causing enzootic outbreaks of IAVs 156 
among domestic poultry in Mexico are clustered in sublineage 3, whereas IAVs 157 
circulating in both wild birds and domestic poultry in the US and Canada during 1966–158 
1990 were grouped in sublineage 4 (Figure 1B).  Eight additional H5 subtype IAVs 159 
identified in poultry from the US and Canada, along with a relatively small number of 160 
wild bird–origin IAVs isolated from samples collected during 1987–2008, clustered in 161 
clades not assigned to these four sublineages (Figure 1B).   162 
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We used the relationships inferred by phylogenetic and nucleotide sequence 163 
identities to further distinguish genetic groups within sublineages 1 and 2. The 78 H5 164 
isolates from North American poultry clustered into 18 distinct genetic groups. Five 165 
genetic groups contained isolates detected in domestic birds sampled on CPFs, nine 166 
genetic groups contained isolates detected in birds sampled from LBMs, two genetic 167 
groups contained isolates detected in birds sampled from BYPs, and two genetic groups 168 
contained isolates detected in birds sampled from GBPs. For most poultry isolates (67%), 169 
nucleotide sequence identity at the HA gene segment of H5 LPAIVs was >99% similar to 170 
that for wild bird–origin viruses (Figure 1B; Figure S1; Table S1); however, within a 171 
genetic group, the poultry isolates were most similar to each other, suggesting a common 172 
introduction event with subsequent spread (Figure S1). Based upon this analysis, each of 173 
the 18 genetic groups was determined to represent discrete introduction events of IAVs 174 
from wild birds to domestic poultry. Additionally, only one production system was 175 
affected in each of the 18 inferred introduction events (e.g., CPFs, BYPs, GBPs, or LBMs) 176 
(Table 1). 177 
Based upon phylogenetic analyses, the NA and internal gene segments of the H5 178 
LPAI from poultry (including CPFs, LBMs, GBPs and BYPs) were genetically diverse 179 
(Figure 2). Phylogenetic analyses also identified potential precursor strains for 15 of the 180 
18 purported introductions; three events were excluded: CPF-CA-2002(H5N2) had an 181 
incomplete genome, LBM-NY-2016(H5N2) lacked wild bird progenitor genes and LBM-182 
NY-2007(H5N2) lacked wild bird precursors (Table 2). For 13 of the inferred 183 
introductions, potential wild bird progenitor strains shared similar phylogenetic positions 184 
in tree topologies with high nucleotide sequence similarity for 3 to 4 gene segments 185 
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(Table 2).  Potential wild bird progenitor viruses across all eight gene segments were 186 
identified for two purported introductions: a Canada goose (Branta canadensis) virus for 187 
CPF-MO-2016(H5N1) and an American wigeon (Mareca americana) for BYP-OR-188 
2006(H5N2) (Table 2). 189 
 190 
Geographic and temporal patterns of H5 LPAIV lineages in North America.  Fifteen 191 
of the 18 introductions were detected in only one flyway: seven within the Atlantic 192 
Flyway (one CPF and six LBM detections), three within the Mississippi Flyway (two 193 
CPF and one BYP detection); one in the Central Flyway (a CPF detection); and four 194 
within the Pacific Flyway (one CPF, one BYP, and two GBP detections). The remaining 195 
three introductions were LBM-associated detections in the Atlantic and Mississippi 196 
Flyways. Of the LBM events, eight were genetically related other IAVs detected in 197 
Canadian provinces or US states (Table 1).  198 
To further evaluate gene flow for the H5 HA gene segment, we performed 199 
phylogeographic analyses for viruses in sublineages 1 and 2. Viruses in sublineage 1, 200 
which included viruses associated with 13 introduction events, were predominantly from 201 
the Central (5.36%), Mississippi (31.07%), and Atlantic (63.57%) Flyways. Most 202 
(81.03%) of the viruses in sublineage 2, associated with three introduction events, were 203 
from wild birds sampled within the Pacific Flyway (Figure 1C). Two events were not 204 
associated with either lineage 1 or 2: CPF-CA-2002(H5N2), and LBM-NY-2007(H5N2), 205 
the latter of which involved seven LPAIVs detected during 2007–2009. Bayesian 206 
analyses of viruses in sublineage 1 and 2 indicated unilateral or bilateral state transitions 207 
suggestive of H5 HA gene flow among the Atlantic, Mississippi, and Central Flyways 208 
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and among the Mississippi, Central, and Pacific Flyways (Bayes factor  >3).  However, 209 
no state transitions suggestive of H5 HA gene flow were supported between the Atlantic 210 
and Pacific Flyways (Bayes factor <3, no significant transition was observed) (Table S2; 211 
Figure S2). In summary, phylogeographic analyses suggested H5 HA gene flow across 212 
adjacent or nearby flyways but not between the Atlantic and Pacific Flyways. 213 
 214 
H5 LPAIVs detected in domestic poultry are likely descendant from those in 215 
dabbling ducks or geese/swans. To understand whether specific hosts were associated 216 
with virus introductions detected in domestic poultry, we categorized bird host species 217 
into 9 functional groups based on taxonomic and ecologic attributes: dabbling duck, 218 
diving/sea duck, goose/swan, gull/tern/seabird, raptor, shorebird, other avian, unknown, 219 
and poultry (see Materials and Methods section for details). Phylogeographic analyses 220 
were performed to estimate Bayes factors between the domestic poultry viruses and 221 
viruses from each functional group. A combination of Bayes factor 3 and mean 222 
indicator 0.5 was used as the threshold of statistical significance; a larger Bayes factor 223 
indicates a higher probability that a specific functional group is associated with an 224 
introduction event (3, 23). 225 
Using phylogeographic analyses, we assessed the genetic origins for 16 of the 18 226 
purported introduction events; two events were excluded: CPF-CA-2002(H5N2) had an 227 
incomplete genome, and LBM-NY-2016(H5N2) lacked related wild bird samples. Our 228 
results suggest that IAVs in wild waterfowl (dabbling ducks, swans/geese, or diving/sea 229 
ducks) were the probable progenitor for at least one viral gene segment for 15 of 16 230 
investigated introduction events; no probable wild bird IAV progenitor was identified for 231 
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LBM-NY-2007(H5N2) (Tables S3 and S4). Neither gulls/terns/seabirds nor raptors were 232 
supported as probable sources of gene segments for H5 IAVs detected in domestic 233 
poultry, and shorebirds were supported as a probable progenitor for only one gene 234 
segment for a single introduction event [MP gene of CPF-VA-2007(H5N1)]. Dabbling 235 
ducks, in particular, were associated with numerous gene segments from North American 236 
poultry viruses, including all gene segments of viruses involved in the following 237 
outbreaks: CPF-WI-2017(H5N2) (Bayes factor 6.59 to 35.12), CPF-MB-2010(H5N2) 238 
(Bayes factor 3.24 to 189.74), LBM-NJ-2015(H5N1) (Bayes factor 4.65 to 138.71), 239 
LBM-NY-2006(H5N2) (Bayes factor 6.89 to 1,244.25), and LBM-NJ-2006a(H5N2) 240 
(Bayes factor 12.21 to >10,000) (Table S4). For recent introductions (2015–2017): CPF-241 
WI-2017(H5N2) was associated with dabbling duck origin viruses across all eight 242 
segments (Bayes factor 6.59 to 35.12) (Table S3); CPF-MO-2016(H5N1) was associated 243 
with goose/swan origin viruses across six segments (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, MP, and NS) 244 
(Bayes factor 15.69 to 149.91) (Figure 3; Table S3); and LBM-NJ-2015(H5N1) was 245 
associated with dabbling duck viruses (HA and NA; Bayes factor 53.98 and 8.12, 246 
respectively), diving/sea duck virus (NP; Bayes factor 169.25), and goose/swan virus (NS; 247 
Bayes factor 9.55) (Table S3). Functional groups associated with all eight gene segments 248 
were identified for only four of the 18 purported introductions into North American 249 
poultry during 2001–2017. Among them, all gene segments were associated with 250 
dabbling duck, goose/swan, or unknown functional groups (Tables S3 and S4). 251 
 252 
H5 LPAIVs in LBMs have potential opportunities for reassortment. The opportunity 253 
for reassortment exists whenever two or more viruses circulate simultaneously. For CPFs, 254 
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only a single genotype was associated with each introduction event, whereas, multiple 255 
genotypes were identified among viruses associated with two of the LBM introductions 256 
[LBM-NY-2006(H5N2) and LBM-NJ-2001(H5N2)]; (Figure 2). Neither LBM virus was 257 
found to be related to other poultry introduction events in this study. Reassortment may 258 
have played a role in the evolutionary pathways of viruses associated with LBM-NY-259 
2006(H5N2) and LBM-NJ-2001(H5N2). Phylogeographic analyses suggest that viruses 260 
from several functional groups may have contributed to the evolution of viruses detected 261 
in LBMs (Table S4). The viruses from the unknown group could include other reservoirs 262 
(e.g. wild bird) for which we lack data or uncontrolled viruses in the LBMs. Thus, these 263 
H5 viruses can be associated with a single introduction of H5 gene, but NA or internal 264 
genes could be associated with viruses (all HA/NA subtypes rather than only H5 subtype) 265 
that may circulate in LBMs or with introductions from other reservoirs (e.g. wild birds).     266 
Compared with H5 viruses detected on CPFs, those detected in LBMs were more 267 
temporally and spatially diverse. For example, four LBM introductions events included 268 
detections over several years and/or multiple states [LBM-NJ-2007(H5N2), LBM-NY-269 
2006(H5N2), LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)b, and LBM-NJ-2001(H5N2)], whereas CPF 270 
introduction events did not occur across years. 271 
 272 
Temporal gaps exist between emergence and detection of H5 LPAIVs in domestic 273 
poultry in North America. The temporal gap between the time of H5 virus introduction 274 
into poultry and flock detection was estimated.  Molecular clock analysis was used to 275 
determine the time of most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) between inferred wild 276 
bird progenitors and poultry isolates, and documented detection dates were obtained for 9 277 
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introduction events (Table 3). Estimated temporal gaps for three CPF introductions were 278 
146, 80, and 142 days (average 123 [37 standard deviation] days) (Table 3). The 279 
temporal gaps for seven LBM introductions varied from 97 to 487 days (average 231 280 
[137 standard deviation] days) (Table 3).  281 
 282 
Discussion 283 
We investigated evolutionary pathways for 78 H5 LPAIVs detected in North 284 
American domestic poultry across CPFs, BYPs, GBPs, and LBMs during 2001–2017; our 285 
data suggest that the events were the result of 18 discrete virus introductions from wild 286 
birds. The H5 LPAIVs from North American poultry in this study share ancestry with 287 
viruses circulating among wild waterfowl, a finding generally consistent with those from 288 
other investigations of outbreaks in US poultry production systems (3, 9, 17-21). Our 289 
findings support that H5 LPAVs maintained in certain wild bird species represent an 290 
ongoing threat to domestic poultry in North America.   291 
  A previous study investigating the ancestral origins of H7 HPAIV reported among 292 
turkeys in Indiana, US, suggested that IAVs from diving ducks were associated with 293 
evolution of the virus ultimately introduced into the CPFs resulting in an outbreak (3).  294 
Our results show limited evidence for diving duck–associated IAVs contributing to the 295 
ancestry of H5 IAVs detected in North American poultry; instead, we found 296 
proportionally more evidence for contributions from dabbling ducks and geese/swans 297 
(Figure 3; Table S4). These findings suggest multiple potential evolutionary pathways for 298 
IAVs that are introduced to domestic poultry, and they highlight one of the challenges for 299 
avian influenza surveillance in wild birds: identifying the most pertinent wild bird species 300 
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to target for sample collection to obtain meaningful reference information for better 301 
understanding the emergence of IAVs among poultry (24, 25).  302 
We explored the time and location of H5 IAV introductions detected in various 303 
poultry production systems, including multiple introductions into CPFs and LBMs but 304 
did not identify any clear patterns for introductions. Instead, H5 IAV introductions 305 
appeared to be sporadic throughout the year and occur in states/provinces in multiple 306 
regions of the US and Canada. However, it is possible that the number of purported H5 307 
introductions identified in this study was too small to detect patterns or that our data were 308 
of insufficient resolution to accurately identify the true times/locations of introduction 309 
events. 310 
 Our results suggest that sublineages of contemporary North American–origin H5 311 
gene segments have different geographic distributions: sublineage 1 was predominantly 312 
detected in the Atlantic Flyway but was also detected at a lower frequency in other 313 
flyways, whereas sublineage 2 was most frequently detected in the Pacific Flyway but 314 
was also identified at lower relative abundance in other flyways. Recent genomic 315 
evidence indicates that viruses initially have modest fidelity to migratory bird flyways; 316 
however, over multiple years, IAV lineages tend to disperse flyways (26, 27). 317 
Sublineages 1 and 2 have been co-circulating in wild birds in the North America since 318 
2002, so their restricted gene flow appears to be atypical. Post-hoc phylogeographic 319 
analyses did not show similar geographic patterns for other HA gene segment sublineages 320 
or for those of other genes (data not shown). Additional research is needed to identify 321 
genetic barriers in North America for these two H5 sublineages. 322 
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     Our results provide evidence that, compared with H5 IAV introductions in North 323 
American LBMs, those in each CPF introduction had a single genotype and more recent 324 
estimated TMRCA with viruses circulating among wild birds. This may indicate that 325 
poultry management activities in North America have successfully identified and quickly 326 
stamped out low pathogenic H5 IAVs in domestic birds raised on CPFs before the viruses 327 
have reassorted or become highly pathogenic. IAVs associated with introductions in 328 
LBMs sometimes had more than one genotype and, compared with CPF-associated IAVs, 329 
had longer mean TMRCAs with inferred wild bird predecessor viruses. Thus, viruses in 330 
North American LBMs may have a longer opportunity to co-circulate with other IAVs 331 
and subsequently form reassortants. Furthermore, the detection of genetically similar 332 
viruses associated with a single introduction event across multiple years and US 333 
states/Canadian provinces suggests that management activities relative to the detection 334 
and stamping out of H5 IAVs may be less efficient in LBMs than on CPFs. 335 
         On the basis of our results, we propose a conceptual model (Figure 4) describing 336 
generalized evolutionary pathways for low pathogenic H5 avian IAVs detected in North 337 
American domestic poultry. Our results suggest that H5 viruses detected in domestic 338 
poultry in the US and Canada are descended from IAVs circulating among wild birds, 339 
typically waterfowl, that are periodically introduced into poultry production systems. It 340 
appears that, on CPFs, H5 IAVs are detected relatively quickly through surveillance 341 
efforts and that the viruses are effectively eradicated through slaughter and additional 342 
preventative measures, as witnessed by apparent independent evolutionary pathways for 343 
viruses of a single genotype associated with each introduction event. In contrast, our 344 
study provides evidence that viruses in LBMs are not detected as rapidly as those on 345 
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CPFs and, therefore, may have a greater potential for genetic reassortment with other 346 
wild bird–associated IAVs. The high mobility of birds sold in LBMs also facilitates the 347 
geographic spread of viruses in the US states and Canada. 348 
     In summary, the apparent repeated introduction of H5 IAVs from wild birds to 349 
domestic poultry in North America highlights the importance of avian IAV surveillance, 350 
particularly at the interface of wild birds and domestic poultry. Proactive and strategic 351 
surveillance covering multiple wild bird species and integrating genomic sequencing 352 
approaches is critical to understanding the evolutionary pathways of IAVs; such 353 
knowledge will be valuable in efforts to refine monitoring activities and optimize early 354 
warning systems. In addition, our findings support the premise that avian H5 IAVs 355 
introduced from wild birds present an ongoing threat to domestic poultry and can be 356 
controlled effectively through management practices, particularly those implemented in 357 
North American CPFs. 358 
 359 
Materials and Methods 360 
Data. To understand the genesis of low pathogenic avian H5 IAVs in North America, we 361 
sequenced 37 isolates recovered from domestic poultry samples collected during 2001–362 
2017 (Table S5); 27 of the isolates were H5N2 viruses (including mixed viruses) from 363 
LBMs, five were H5N2 viruses from CPFs, one was H5N2 virus from a BYP, one was 364 
H5N2 virus from a GBP, and three were H1N1viruses from turkeys (n = 2) and a chicken 365 
(n = 1). Of note, if multiple isolates identified from the same case report had identical 366 
genomic sequences, only one of the isolates was selected for this study. We analyzed 367 
sequence data for these 34 poultry H5 isolates and 44 other North American poultry–368 
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origin IAVs deposited in public databases (total of 78 H5 isolates) (Table 1).In addition, 369 
we sequenced 127 H5 IAV isolates originating from wild birds (mostly during 2015 and 370 
2016, n = 116) in 30 US states (Table S5); the isolates were from dabbling ducks (n = 94), 371 
shorebirds (n = 16), geese/swans (n = 10), gulls/terns/seabirds (n = 3), diving/sea ducks 372 
(n = 1), and unknown avian species (n = 3). Genomic sequencing and sequence assembly 373 
were performed as previously described (3); the GenBank accession numbers are listed in 374 
Table S5. The geographic, temporal, and host distribution of all viruses we sequenced are 375 
shown in Figure S3. In this study, the IAVs from commercial flocks and LBMs were 376 
isolated during poultry pre-movement monitoring activities, suspected IAV outbreaks or 377 
surveillance activities; the IAVs from wild birds were isolated during active influenza 378 
surveillance. 379 
To perform systematic analyses, we retrieved the genomic sequences for all 380 
avian-origin IAVs from the following public databases in April 2017: the Influenza Virus 381 
Resources (28) (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU), the Influenza Research 382 
Database (29) (https://www.fludb.org), and GISAID (30) (https://www.gisaid.org). For 383 
those viruses for which we obtained redundant sequences, we only included the longest 384 
sequence contig per gene segment in analyses. In total, we used sequences from ~20,000 385 
influenza viruses worldwide, including >9,000 IAVs of North American origin (Table 386 
S6). Because our preliminary phylogenetic analyses of these genomic sequences 387 
suggested that the low pathogenic H5 IAV isolates in domestic poultry were genetically 388 
related to North American lineage IAVs (data not shown), we focused subsequent data 389 
analyses only on sequences for IAVs detected in North America. The temporal and host 390 
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distribution of all viruses of North American origin included in this study are shown in 391 
Figure S4.  392 
 393 
Sequence alignment and phylogenetic analysis. Multiple sequence alignments were 394 
generated using MAFFT v7.273 (31). Phylogenic analyses were performed using an 395 
approximate maximum-likelihood method with a generalized time–reversible substitution 396 
model and ‘CAT’ approximation rate model by using FastTree v2.1 (32). These 397 
preliminary trees provided initial inference regarding tree topology among all sequences 398 
in the public databases, specifically to differentiate gene segment sequences of North 399 
American lineages from those of Eurasian lineages. A refined phylogenetic tree for each 400 
gene segment was then re-constructed using a maximum-likelihood method by running 401 
RAxML v 8.2.9 (33). A gamma model of rate heterogeneity and a generalized time–402 
reversible substitution model were used for these phylogenetic analyses, and 403 
bootstrapping was conducted using the same rate and substitution model. Phylogenetic 404 
trees were visualized by ggtree v1.6.11 (34) and FigTree v1.4.3 405 
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). Topologies of phylogenetic trees were 406 
validated using MrBayes 3.2.7 (35), PAUP* 4.0 (36), and PHYLIP 3.6 (37).  407 
 408 
Genotype analyses and assignment of possible progenitor gene and potential 409 
precursor viruses for low pathogenic H5 avian IAVs. Genotypes for IAVs were 410 
assigned through analyses assessing genetic similarity among viral genome constellations. 411 
Gene segments were considered to be genotypically similar if they co-occurred in clades 412 
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with other gene segment sequences (as determined using inferred tree topology) with a 413 
minimum bootstrap value of 70 and shared nucleotide sequence identities 95% (18). 414 
     Possible progenitor gene segments and precursor viruses for H5 IAVs of North 415 
American poultry origin were also assessed using tree topology and sequence identities.  416 
Possible progenitor gene segments were inferred when the following criteria were met: 1) 417 
the candidate gene segment shared a phylogenetic clade with a minimum bootstrap value 418 
of 70 with a North American poultry gene segment; 2) the candidate progenitor gene 419 
segment and North American poultry gene segment shared 98% nucleotide sequence 420 
identity; 3) the candidate gene segment shared the highest nucleotide sequence identity 421 
with the poultry-origin IAV gene segment in its genetic cluster; and 4) the putative 422 
progenitor gene segment was detected prior to detection of the North American poultry 423 
IAV gene segment. A potential precursor virus was inferred when a virus had three or 424 
more possible progenitor gene segments from an H5 IAV identified in North American 425 
poultry. 426 
 427 
Definition of purported H5 introduction into North American poultry. Multiple H5 428 
IAVs detected in North American domestic poultry were inferred to have resulted from 429 
the same introduction event if the following criteria were met: 1) the genetic sequence for 430 
the H5 HA gene segment of these two viruses shared a common clade with a minimum 431 
bootstrap value of 70; 2) the H5 HA gene segment of these two viruses shared 98% 432 
nucleotide sequence identity; and 3) the nucleotide sequence identity shared with H5 HA 433 
gene segments from IAVs originating from North American poultry was greater than that 434 
shared with gene segments from wild bird–origin IAVs. 435 
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 436 
Phylogeographic analyses to infer transition of viruses between wild birds and 437 
domestic poultry and between North American migratory bird flyways. To enable 438 
inference of wild bird hosts associated with H5 IAV introductions in North American 439 
domestic poultry, we performed phylogeographic analyses to assess support for 440 
associations between specific functional groups of wild bird IAV hosts and H5 IAV gene 441 
segments detected in domestic poultry. Hosts of influenza viruses were categorized into 9 442 
functional groups: dabbling duck, diving/sea duck, goose/swan, gull/tern/seabird, raptor, 443 
shorebird, other avian (i.e., American coot, double-crested cormorant, red-necked grebe, 444 
rock dove, and western grebe; n = 5), and unknown (i.e., hosts for whom the species was 445 
unclear or for which the domestic status was ambiguous, including ducks, geese, feces, 446 
fowl, and poultry; n = 22). To minimize sampling bias, we balanced the number of 447 
sequences in each host group by resampling: for each year, we randomly selected a 448 
maximum of 10 sequences from each functional group.  449 
 Phylogeographic analyses were performed as previously described (3, 23). An 450 
asymmetric substitution model with Bayesian stochastic search variable selection and a 451 
strict clock model were applied in the analyses. We used Markov chain Monte Carlo 452 
methods, setting the chain length to 100 million with sampling every 10,000 states. The 453 
convergence of each run was checked by Tracer v1.6 (http://beast.community/tracer) 454 
before continuing to the next step. All poorly configured states were removed according 455 
to a 10% burn-in rate. After that, maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees were 456 
generated using TreeAnnotator v1.8.4 (38) (http://beast.community/treeannotator). Bayes 457 
factor was calculated to indicate the statistical support level. Significant transition was 458 
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indicated by a combination of Bayes factor 3 and mean indicator 0.5. Statistical 459 
support levels were interpreted from Bayes factors as follows:  Bayes factor <3 indicates 460 
no support; 3 ≤ Bayes factor <10 indicates support; 10 ≤ Bayes factor <100 indicates 461 
strong support; 100 ≤ Bayes factor <1000indicates very strong support; and Bayes factor  462 
≥1,000 indicates decisive support. Maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees were 463 
visualized by FigTree v1.4.3 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). 464 
In addition to the above analyses on the potential sources of wild bird hosts for 465 
the H5 IAV gene segments detected in domestic poultry, we also inferred the transition 466 
patterns of influenza A viruses across North American migratory bird flyways. We first 467 
designated each US state and Canadian province into either the Atlantic, Mississippi, 468 
Central, or Pacific Flyway based on the administrative definition of North American 469 
migratory bird flyways (https://www.fws.gov/birds/management/flyways.php) (Figure 470 
1C). Phylogeographic analyses were then performed to assess support for transitions of 471 
IAVs between among migratory bird flyways. To minimize the biases for sample 472 
selection, we included all viruses in sublineages 1 and 2 (identified from phylogenetic 473 
tree of H5 gene) in the phylogeographic analyses. Phylogeographic analyses and data 474 
interpretation are the same as described above. 475 
 476 
TMRCA estimation. The Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method implemented in 477 
BEAST v1.8.4 (38) was used to estimate the substitution rates and TMRCA between 478 
inferred predecessor HA gene segments of IAVs identified in the wild bird reservoir and 479 
H5 IAVs detected in poultry for which specific dates of detection were available.  SRD06 480 
partitioned substitution model, uncorrelated lognormal relaxed clock model, and 481 
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Bayesian skyline coalescent tree prior were implemented in the molecular clock analyses. 482 
Two independent runs with 100 million chain length (sampling frequency = 10,000) were 483 
combined by LogCombiner v1.8.4 (http://beast.community/logcombiner) and then 484 
analyzed by Tracer v1.6 using a 10% burn-in rate 485 
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer/).  486 
 487 
Accession number(s). Sequence were deposited in GenBank under accession numbers 488 
CY235315 to CY235322, KU310460 to KU310475, KY131302 to KY131333, 489 
KY131357 to KY131364, KY550909 to KY550916, MF046190, MF046211, MF046222, 490 
MF046227, MF046237, MF046275, MF046276, MF046280, MF046298, MF046299, 491 
MF046306, MF046330, MF046351, MF046361, MF046366, MF046376, MF046389, 492 
MF046403, MF046406, MF046412, MF046415, MF046416, MF046434, MF046442, 493 
MF046448, MF046452, MF046468, MF046472, MF046481, MF046490, MF046496, 494 
MF046504, MF046507, MF046509, MF046514, MF046523, MF046531, MF046536, 495 
MF046544, MF046547, MF046556, MF046567, MF046570, MF359819 to MF359890, 496 
MF613674, MF613685, MF613713, MF613716, MF613724, MF613731, MF613745, 497 
MF613747, MF613753, MF613755, MF613762, MF613766, MF613772, MF613776, 498 
MF613777, MF613792, MF613809, MF613812, MF613817, MF613823, MF613869, 499 
MF613881, MF613903, MF613905, MF613918, MF613924, MF613928, MF613937, 500 
MF613940, MH341739 to MH341906, and MH546139 to MH547031.  501 
 502 
 503 
 504 
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Figure Legends 652 
 653 
Figure 1. Detections of low pathogenic H5 avian influenza A viruses in domestic poultry 654 
in the United States and Canada (2001–2017). A) The temporal distributions of 655 
introductions of H5 viruses detected on commercial poultry farms (CPFs), backyard 656 
poultry (BYPs), game bird poultry (GBPs,) and in live bird markets (LBMs) during 657 
2001–2017. An introduction was defined by a tree topology of the H5 gene with a 658 
bootstrap value ≥70 (Figure S1) and shared nucleotide sequence identity >98%. B) 659 
Simplified phylogenetic tree displaying general topology for North American sequence of 660 
influenza A viruses at the H5 hemagglutinin gene. The distribution of functional groups 661 
of wild bird hosts for influenza A viruses in the tree are summarized by pie charts. C) US 662 
state and Canadian province of origin for H5 subtype influenza A virus isolates detected 663 
in North American domestic poultry during 2001–2017 and geographic distribution of the 664 
influenza A viruses of H5 sublineages 1 and 2 in wild birds based on the North American 665 
administrative definition of migratory bird flyways 666 
(https://www.fws.gov/birds/management/flyways.php). Circle sizes indicate the number 667 
of H5 influenza A virus isolates in the corresponding US state/Canadian province. Based 668 
on ecologic attributes, the hosts of influenza viruses were categorized into 9 different 669 
groups: dabbling duck, diving/sea duck, goose/swan, gull/tern/seabird, poultry, raptor, 670 
shorebird, other avian, and unknown. Viruses from avian species that did not fit into any 671 
of these functional groups were categorized as ‘other avian’, and viruses for which the 672 
species sampled were unclear or for which the domestic status was ambiguous were 673 
categorized as ‘unknown’.  674 
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 675 
Figure 2. Summary of genotypic analysis of low pathogenic H5 avian influenza A 676 
viruses detected in domestic poultry in the United States (2001–2017). Genotypes were 677 
assigned by unique combinations of sublineages for each gene, which were determined 678 
based on tree topology with a bootstrap value ≥ 70 and a nucleotide sequence identity ≥ 679 
95%. To simplify the illustration, only the representative viruses were selected for each 680 
genotype including those with unique combinations of location of detection 681 
(state/province) and year. Numbers on the tree indicate individual H5 low pathogenic 682 
introductions and were linked to unique IDs of those introductions to the right. 683 
 684 
Figure 3. Summary of analyses to assess transition of influenza A viruses from a specific 685 
functional group of wild birds to the low pathogenic H5 avian influenza A viruses 686 
detected in domestic poultry. In this figure, phylogeographical analyses showed one 687 
recent and representative H5 low pathogenic introduction in North American poultry, 688 
CPF-MO-2016(H5N1), which is an introduction of virus in Missouri turkey as an 689 
example. The trees shown in the figure are constructed on the basis of the maximum 690 
clade credibility phylogenetic trees. Phylogeographical analyses were performed using all 691 
isolates for each inferred H5 introduction. Branches of the phylogenetic trees were 692 
colored according to the estimated ancestral state of the functional group of wild birds 693 
from discrete trait reconstruction. Arrow widths are based on the Bayes Factor support 694 
levels. Statistical support is provided in greater detail in Table S3. 695 
 696 
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Figure 4. Conceptual model summarizing the generalized inferred evolutionary pathways 697 
for low pathogenic (LP) H5 avian influenza A viruses (IAVs) detected on commercial 698 
poultry farms and in live bird markets (LBMs) in the United States and Canada during 699 
2001–2017. H5 viruses introduced by wild waterfowl were inferred to circulate for a 700 
longer time in LBMs than on commercial poultry farms. Furthermore, we found evidence 701 
suggesting reassortment between H5 viruses and other influenza A viruses in LBMs, 702 
resulting in multiple genotypes associated with a single introduction event. The blue and 703 
red lines denote genetically distinct gene segments; in each virus, the segments were 704 
vertically sorted in the order of PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, MP, and NS. 705 
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Table 1. H5 LPAI viruses detected in domestic poultry in the United States and Canada (2001–2017). 
Introductiona Host Region Year Isolate name a Sample date Subtype 
BYP-MI-2015(H5N2) mallard Michigan 2015 A/mallard/Michigan/15-031493-1orig/2015 2015-10-01 H5N2 
BYP-OR-2006(H5N2) duck guinea fowl Oregon 2006 
A/duck/Oregon/459674-3/2006 2006-09-29 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/Oregon/459674-5/2006 2006-09-29 H5N2 
GBP-CA-2014(H5N8) quail California 2014 A/quail/California/K1400794/2014 2014-04 H5N8 
GBP-ID-2008(H5N8) pheasant Idaho 2008 A/pheasant/Idaho/08-002590-63/2008 2008 H5N8 
CPF-WI-2017(H5N2) turkey Wisconsin 2017 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/17-007146-1/2017 2017-03-02 H5N2 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/17-007146-2/2017 2017-03-02 H5N2 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/17-007146-3/2017 2017-03-02 H5N2 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/17-007319-3/2017 2017-03-03 H5N2 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/17-007981-6/2017 2017-03-09 H5N2 
CPF-MO-2016(H5N1) turkey Missouri 2016 A/turkey/Missouri/16-014037-7/2016 2016-04-29 H5N1 
CPF-MB-2010(H5N2) turkey Manitoba 2010 A/turkey/MB/FAV11/2010 2010-11-25 H5N2 
A/turkey/MB/FAV10/2010 2010-11-26 H5N2 
CPF-VA-2007(H5N1) turkey Virginia 2007 A/turkey/VA/505477-18/2007 2007-07-11 H5N1 
A/turkey/Virginia/505477-17/2007 2007-07-11 H5N1 
CPF-CA-2002(H5N2) turkey California 2002 A/turkey/CA/D0208651-C/02 2002 H5N2 
LBM-NY-2016(H5N2) 
duck 
muscovy 
duck 
Ontario 
New York 
New Jersey 
2016 
A/domesticduck/ON/FAV-18CS46/2016 2016 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/16-020978-2orig/2016 2016 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/16-021467-1orig/2016 2016 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/16-021916-1orig/2016 2016 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/16-021920-1orig/2016 2016 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewJersey/16-021456-4/2016 2016 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewJersey/16-021457-2/2016 2016 H5N2 
LBM-NJ-2015(H5N1) chicken New Jersey 2015 A/chicken/New_Jersey/15_002659_2/2015 2015-01-20 H5N1 
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LBM-NJ-2011(H5N2) duck New Jersey 2011 A/duck/NewJersey/11-064045-002/2011 2011-12-20 H5N2 
LBM-NY-2007(H5N2) 
duck 
muscovy 
duck 
New York 2007-2009 
A/duck/NewYork/07-002127-001/2007 2007-10-30 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewYork/08-000560-002/2008 2008-03-13 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/08-000759-001/2008 2008-04-22 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/08-000937-001/2008 2008-05-22 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewYork/09-002670-002/2009 2009-03-04 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/09-005059-001/2009 2009-04-14 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewYork/09-005059-002/2009 2009-04-14 H5N2 
LBM-PA-2007(H5N2) 
chicken 
duck 
guinea fowl 
muscovy 
duck 
pleasant 
Pennsylvania  
New York 
New Jersey 
2007-2008 
A/duck/Pennsylvania/07-002198-003/2007 2007-11-09 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewJersey/07-002376-001/2007 2007-12-05 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/NewYork/08-000170-003/2008 2008-01-07 H5N2 
A/pheasant/NewYork/08-000170-002/2008 2008-01-07 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/NewYork/08-000238-001/2008 2008-01-28 H5N2 
A/chicken/NewJersey/251-4/2008 2008-02-01 H5N2 
A/chicken/NewJersey/577-6/2008 2008-03-27 H5N2 
A/chicken/NewJersey/08-000640-006/2008 2008-04-03 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/NewJersey/08-000640-008/2008 2008-04-03 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/NewJersey/08-000841-001/2008 2008-05-14 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewJersey/08-000912-001/2008 2008-05-28 H5N2 
LBM-NY-2006(H5N2) 
duck 
quail 
turkey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 2006-2007 
A/duck/NewYork/465571/2006 2006-10-23 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/465976/2006 2006-10-24 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/466787/2006 2006-10-31 H5N2 
A/turkey/NewYork/465977/2006 2006-10-31 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/470179/2006 2006-11-07 H5N2 
A/avian/NewYork/466812/2006 2006-11-09 H5N2 
A/duck/Pennsylvania/07-467189-1/2006 2006-11-09 Mixed 
A/duck/NewYork/469961/2006 2006-11-13 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/489761/2007 2007 H5N2 
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A/duck/NewYork/481172/2007 2007-01-23 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/483239/2007 2007-02-02 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/484057/2007 2007-02-06 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/484680/2007 2007-02-12 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/490722/2007 2007-03-21 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/492652/2007 2007-04-05 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/494165/2007 2007-04-18 H5N2 
A/quail/NewYork/07-501360-1/2007 2007-06-02 H5N2 
A/quail/NewYork/501360/2007 2007-06-12 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/504371/2007 2007-06-22 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/504372/2007 2007-06-22 H5N2 
LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)a 
chicken 
duck 
muscovy 
duck 
New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
2006 
A/avian/NewJersey/437109/2006 2006-05-09 H5N2 
A/chicken/NewYork/439236/2006 2006-05-10 H5N2 
A/chicken/NewYork/439235/2006 2006-05-15 H5N2 
A/muscovyduck/NewYork/62095-1/2006 2006-05-15 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/440410/2006 2006-05-17 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/440409/2006 2006-05-23 H5N2 
A/duck/NewYork/445743/2006 2006-06-19 H5N2 
A/chicken/Pennsylvania/446080-7/2006 2006-07 H5N2 
A/duck/Pennsylvania/446080-6/2006 2006-07 H5N2 
A/duck/Pennsylvania/446080-7/2006 2006-07 H5N2 
LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)b guinea fowl New York New Jersey 2006-2007 
A/avian/NewYork/448534/2006 2006 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/NewJersey/447114/2006 2006-07-19 H5N2 
A/guineafowl/NewJersey/07-002030-001/2007 2007-10-23 H5N2 
LBM-NJ-2001(H5N2) duck Maine New Jersey 2001-2002 
A/duck/NJ/117228-7/2001 2001-07-16 H5N2 
A/duck/ME/151895-7A/2002 2002-01-29 H5N2 
aAn isolate is defined as an avian influenza virus recovered from wild birds or domestic poultry. An introduction describes a case of 
avian influenza infection detected in domestic poultry, and one or multiple isolates can be recovered from the same introduction. 
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Table 2. Potential precursor viruses for predominate genotype of low pathogenic H5 avian influenza virus introductions in domestic poultry in in 
the United States and Canada (2001-2017) 
 
Representative isolate  Introduction Potential precursor virusa No.b 
Sequence Identity (%)c 
HA NA PB2 PB1 PA NP MP NS 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/17-007146-1/2017  CPF-WI-2017(H5N2) A/northernpintail/Ohio/15OS5861/2015(H5N2) 4 99.14 98.81 
  
98.26 98.96 
  
A/turkey/Missouri/16-014037-7/2016  CPF-MO-2016(H5N1) A/canadagoose/DelawareBay/601/2016(H5N1) 8 98.82 99.29 99.43 99.56 99.35 99.53 99.47 99.52 
A/turkey/MB/FAV10/2010  CPF-MB-2010(H5N2) A/americangreen-wingedteal/Illinois/2975/2009(Mixed) 4 
 
98.74 
 
98.18 
 
98.88 
 
99.29 
A/turkey/VA/50547718/2007  CPF-VA-2007(H5N1) A/mallard/PA/454069-9/2006(H5N1) 4 98.74 99.39 
 
98.31 
  
99.40 
 
A/turkey/CA/D0208651C/02  CPF-CA-2002(H5N2) NDd 
A/duck/NewYork/16-020978-2orig/2016 LBM-NY-2016(H5N2) ND 
A/chicken/NewJersey/150026592/2015  LBM-NJ-2015(H5N1) A/americangreen-wingedteal/Wisconsin/11OS3580/2011 (H11N2) 4     98.18 98.33 98.55 99.16 
A/duck/NewJersey/11-064045-002/2011 LBM-NJ-2011(H5N2) A/mallard/Ohio/11OS1961/2011(H5N2) 4 99.60 99.86 
 
98.92 
  
99.80 
 
A/duck/NewYork/08-000759-001/2008 LBM-NY-2007(H5N2) ND 
A/chicken/NewJersey/2514/2008  LBM-NJ-2007(H5N2) A/mallard/Maryland/07OS2433/2007(H5N2) 3 98.90 98.25 
     
98.24 
A/turkey/NewYork/465977/2006  LBM-NY-2006(H5N2) A/americanwigeon/Iowa/463993/2006(H5N2) 4 99.08 98.54 
 
98.53 98.29 
   
A/chicken/Pennsylvania/4460807/2006  LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)a A/mallard/Maryland/897/2004(H5N2) 4 98.63 98.75 
 
99.01 
 
99.29 
  
A/avian/NewYork/448534/2006  LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)b A/mallard/Ohio/468158/2006(H5N2) 4 98.34 98.63 
  
98.14 
 
98.30 
 
A/duck/NJ/1172287/2001  LBM-NJ-2001(H5N2) A/mallard/Maryland/302/2001(H5N2) 3 
 
98.58 
  
98.48 
  
99.42 
A/mallard/Michigan/15-031493-1orig/2015 BYP-MI-2015(H5N2) A/mallard/Ohio/11OS2156/2011(H5N2) 4 98.68 98.96 
   
98.57 
 
99.30 
A/duck/Oregon/4596743/2006  BYP-OR-2006(H5N2) A/americanwidgeon/Oregon/467919/2006(H5N2) 8 99.60 100.00 99.83 99.78 99.86 99.81 99.73 99.88 
A/quail/California/K1400794/2014  GBP-CA-2014(H5N8) A/mallard/California/1479/2013(mixed) 3  98.05   98.07  99.20  
A/pheasant/Idaho/08-002590-63/2008 GBP-ID-2008(H5N8) A/ruddyturnstone/NewJersey/AI06-582/2006(H6N7) 3     98.40 98.78     98.40   
 
aA potential precursor virus was defined by the virus with at least three possible progenitor genes (see method section for details); b Number of 
possible progenitor genes; cOnly sequence identity >98% are shown: dND, not done because complete genome was not available. 
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Table 3. Time to most recent common ancestor estimation of HA gene for low pathogenic H5 avian influenza A virus introductions 
from commercial farms (CPFs) and live bird markets (LBMs) in the United States and Canada (2001-2017). 
 
Source Introduction a Mean TMRCA 95% HPDb low 95% HPD high First detectedc 
Differenced 
(days) 
Average 
(days) 
Standard  
deviation 
Commercial Farms 
CPF-WI-2017(H5N2) 2016-10-07 2016-01-01 2016-06-18 2017-03-02 146 
123 37 
CPF-MB-2010(H5N2) 2010-09-06 2010-11-16 2010-06-02 2010-11-25 80 
CPF-VA-2007(H5N1) 2007-02-19 2007-06-10 2006-10-09 2007-07-11 142 
Live Bird Markets 
LBM-NY-2007(H5N2) 2007-07-24 2007-10-18 2007-04-02 2007-10-30 97 
231 137 
LBM-PA-2007(H5N2) 2007-06-23 2007-09-23 2007-03-14 2007-11-09 138 
LBM-NY-2006(H5N2) 2006-02-12 2006-06-17 2005-10-09 2006-10-23 253 
LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)a 2005-09-26 2006-01-18 2005-05-17 2006-05-09 225 
LBM-NJ-2006(H5N2)b 2006-01-09 2006-06-22 2005-07-10 2006-07-19 191 
LBM-NJ-2001(H5N2) 2000-03-16 2001-03-01 1999-01-23 2001-07-16 487 
 
a For each introduction, all isolates with exact sampling date were included in analysis; bFirst detected date of an introduction was defined as the 
earliest sampling date among all isolates within this introduction; c HPD, highest posterior density;  dDifference between date of first detection and 
mean time to most recent common ancestor. 
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